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1. INTRODUCTION
The UN’s unprecedented decade-plus experience in East Timor in a number of 
institutional guises represents perhaps the most extensive peace-building opera-
tion the world body has ever ventured on. From referendum assistance under the 
UN Assistance Mission in East Timor in 1999 to two-and-a-half years of interim 
transitional administration under UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) and a series of subsequent assistance missions, the small half-island 
has proven an effective laboratory for third-generation peace-building doctrinal 
theory. In particular, the East Timorese experience tested practically the UN’s 
developing understanding of the triangular relationship between the necessarily 
long-term process of rule of law reconstruction, the more short-term exigencies of 
transitional justice and the security-driven imperatives of the nascent democratic 
polity that emerges from peace-building. The UN’s work in these areas has been 
manifested primarily in (a) successive processes of territorial administration, 
assistance and capacity-building in the national court system by various UN mis-
sions that continue to this day, and (b) the hybrid Special Panels process that ran 
from 2000-2005 combining international judges and prosecutors with Timorese 
equivalents to try human rights abuses committed in the period surrounding the 
1999 referendum. Despite some significant initial success in prosecuting indi-
viduals guilty of committing international crimes and in developing a cadre of 
capable Timorese judges and prosecutors to serve the million-strong population, 
there is strong evidence that East Timor has yet to become a rule of law-based 
state, especially insofar as this is manifested in the separation of powers and 
respect for the independence of the courts. Though democratic procedures have 
taken a reasonably firm root at executive and legislative level, at a judicial level 
persistent governmental interference in politically-sensitive trials has been iden-
tified one of the most serious long-term threats to the security of the state.1
 In seeking an explanation for this state of affairs, it is natural to look at the 
influence (or lack thereof) of the Special Panels and the capacity-building pro-
gramme of the UN in the past decade, tasked as they were with grounding a rule 
of law culture in East Timor. Though the latter has been subject to some criti-
cism for the continued reliance of the Timorese courts on foreign expertise,2 the 
hybrid Special Panel process was completed with more widespread condemna-
tion. Behind impressive statistics for convictions relative to contemporaneous 
transitional trials in other states, there were very serious shortcomings in the 
quality of the process. As resources became stretched and international attention 
waned, law was misapplied, defendants’ rights were systematically breached, 
1. UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated 
Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 24 September 2009 to 20 January 2010), UN Doc. 
S/2010/85, 12 February 2010, paras. 80-87 (hereinafter: UN Secretary-General 2010 Report). 
2. Freedom House, USAID and American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, Rule of Law 
in Timor Leste, June 2007, available at: <www.abanet.org/rol/publications/east_timor_rule_of_
law_assessment_june_2007.pdf>, at p. 40.
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and a number of bewildering decisions were issued which called into question the 
overall fairness of the trials.3 Lost somewhat amidst the torrent of criticism was 
a significant episode of governmental interference in the process, when the pros-
ecution policy ran contrary to policy of the newly-independent Timorese state. 
The Timorese leadership was active in undermining the indictment of the Indone-
sian military leader and politician General Wiranto which the UN not only failed 
to prevent, but also meekly acquiesced in. Many of the problems with the Special 
Panels process were due to resource constraints and so can be blamed more on 
UN member states keen to see ‘justice on the cheap’4 than the world body itself. 
However, the Wiranto episode undermined predictions confidently made in UN 
peace-building doctrine that the UN’s participation in transitional accountability 
processes could facilitate rule of law-based interactions between emerging post-
conflict rulers and the court system in politically-contentious  trials.
 Analysis of the Special Panels’ impact has tended to stop at the date the pro-
cesses ended in May 2005. However, this approach elides the extent to which the 
hybridisation of prosecutorial and judicial functions visible first in the Special 
Panels remains a continuing feature, and how the political interference mani-
fest in the Wiranto Indictment set a precedent continues to this day. This article 
examines the enduring failure of the UN’s institutional assistance to the Timorese 
courts to foster respect for the autonomy of the court system on the part of a 
government with ‘creeping autocratic tendencies’.5 It does so in the context of a 
Timorese judiciary beginning to deal with politically-sensitive cases arising from 
human rights abuses in the Indonesian occupation, a period of widespread politi-
cal violence in 2006 that toppled a government, and the attempted assassinations 
of the President and Prime Minister in 2008. Examining the pervasiveness of 
political interference in Timorese criminal justice in light of the opportunities 
afforded by UNTAET’s period of International Territorial Administration (ITA) 
and the principles expressed in the UN Secretary-General’s seminal Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice Report in 2004,6 the article cites a crucial failure of exam-
ple in the Special Panels apparatus to make effective the relationship between 
transitional justice, democratisation and domestic rule of law envisaged in peace-
building doctrine. UN Territorial Administration and the Report place great faith 
3. See D. Cohen, Indifference and Accountability: The United Nations and the Politics of 
International Justice in East Timor (Honolulu, East-West Centre 2006); M. Hirst and H. Varney, 
‘Justice Abandoned? An Assessment of the Serious Crimes Process in East Timor’, International 
Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) Occasional Papers Series (2005), available at: <www.ictj.
org/images/content/1/2/121.pdf>.
4. D. Cohen, ‘“Justice on the Cheap” Revisited: The Failure of the Serious Crimes Trials in 
East Timor’, Asia Pacific Issues No. 80 (2006), available at: <www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/
stored/pdfs//api080.pdf>.
5. H. Myrttinen, ‘Timor-Leste: A Relapsing Success Story’, 5 Taiwan Journal of Democracy 
(2010) p. 219 at p. 222.
6. UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Con-
flict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 3 August 2004, p. 27 (hereinafter: Rule of Law and Transi-
tional Justice Report).
NILR21-1_Book 1.indb   105 14-4-2011   13:34:00
P. MCAULIFFE106 NILR 2011
in transfusions of international staff to bolster the independence of judicial insti-
tutions. However, the Timorese experience suggests that institutional responses 
at a judicial level are unlikely to be successful in either the immediate transitional 
trial or in the longer-term if they are not accompanied by behavioural or cultural 
change at a political level among the new national leadership to respect judicial 
independence in difficult circumstances of socio-political instability. 
 Section 2 examines the UN’s developing understanding of the links between 
transitional justice, the rule of law and democratisation in post-conflict states. 
Section 3 examines UNTAET’s response to Indonesia’s rule of law legacy in East 
Timor, while section 4 appraises how the Special Panels coped with interference 
from the national political leadership in their most diplomatically sensitive trials. 
Section 5 considers the endurance of the example set by the Special Panels in 
the modern day as the hybridised criminal justice system attempts to investigate, 
prosecute and punish crimes in politically sensitive trials that might jeopardise 
the emerging peace.
2. PEACEBUILDING AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
2.1 Peace-building and the dangers of institutionalism
Historically, the ideal narrative of UN peace operations was essentially straight-
forward – antagonists were separated, disarmed and demobilised, a transitional 
government was formed, elections were held and the UN withdrew all or most 
of its contingent.7 However, as a series of missions in the 1990s failed to cope 
with the post-Cold War phenomenon of failed states, it became apparent that 
traditional, temporary, ad hoc measures were not enough to build sustainable 
peace.8 The UN acknowledged that restoring the capacity and legitimacy of 
national institutions was imperative and so decided to exercise as many of the 
standard powers of state as were necessary for as long as was required to restore 
the rule of law. The Security Council began to give UN missions wide legisla-
tive, executive and judicial mandates to carry out their functions and placed a 
hitherto unseen emphasis on strengthening the rule of law in transitional societ-
ies. In Kosovo and East Timor, the UN turned to the unprecedentedly intrusive 
process of transitional administration. It involved the organisation assuming the 
centralised executive, legislative and judicial powers of the state on a temporary 
basis to construct or reconstruct institutions of governance capable of provid-
ing citizens with the security from which long-term peace might be ensured. 
Transitional administration was designed to foster political, social and economic 
co-operation between previously warring sides who could then coalesce around 
7. S. Ratner, The New UN Peace-keeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold 
War (New York, St. Martin’s Press 1995) pp. 117-136 and pp. 209-236.
8. Panel on UN Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
(‘The Brahimi Report’), UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
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the interim body to work together in the pursuit of a durable peace. It was to 
culminate in the juridical transfer of power from the UN transitional authority to 
Kosovar and Timorese governments.
Transitional administration is a phenomenon with a long history in many 
guises, but its appearance in any state automatically implies the failure in real-
ising the ‘normal’ model of local territorial governance.9 Wilde posits that 
international transitional administration responds to two perceived problems.10 
The first, as seen in Kosovo, is a sovereignty problem caused by the acceptabil-
ity or otherwise of the identity of local actors exercising government powers. 
International administration deemed necessary in the absence of social consen-
sus on which local actors should enjoy control. The second instance, of more 
relevance to the initially politically-unified East Timor, is where the identity of 
the local actors was not at issue, but rather their ability to govern a state com-
petently. Where governance is at issue, Wilde observes that traditionally two of 
the main policy objectives for peace-building missions were (i) the actual opera-
tion of governmental institutions such as the courts, and (ii) the furtherance of 
democratic processes within those institutions.11 Though intuitively sound, the 
UN’s adoption of this approach is characteristic of the tendency of neo-liberal 
interventions to define state failure in terms of state capacity. Under such an 
approach, good governance ‘serv[es] simultaneously as the assessment criteria 
for state capacity and as the objective of capacity-building’, thereby embodying 
‘a technocratic understanding of the state and of state dynamics’.12 As Kosken-
niemi puts it, ‘the international administration of territory is often discussed as 
if it involved merely problems of technical governance’.13 Unlike in the case of 
sovereignty problems, institutions become defined by their capacities and func-
tions rather than the political and social conflicts that run through them.14 The 
danger with strategies that prioritise capacity in objective and technical terms is 
that they may ‘mask’ the inevitably political nature of such projects – influencing 
the behaviour of national leaders to commit to certain standards takes a subordi-
nate role (if any) to the predominantly technical task of forming new institutions 
‘from scratch’.15
9. R. Wilde, International Territorial Administration – How Trusteeship and the Civilizing 
Mission Never Went Away (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007) p. 192.
10. Ibid., pp. 193-232.
11. R. Wilde, ‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial 
Administration’, 95 AJIL (2001) p. 583 at p. 593.
12. S. Hameiri, ‘Failed States or Failed Paradigm? State Capacity and the Limits of Institution-
alism’, 10 Journal of International Relations and Development (2007) p. 122 at pp. 128-129.
13. M. Koskenniemi, ‘Foreword’, in O. Korhonen and J. Gras, International Governance in 
Post-Conflict Situations (Helsinki, Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights 
2001) p. vi. 
14. Hameiri, supra n. 12, p. 131.
15. J. Meierhenreich, ‘Forming States After Failure’, in R. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: 
Causes and Consequences (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press 2004) p. 153 at p. 153.
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2.2 The importance of judicial autonomy in transition
Because of its increased role in the administration of justice, the UN first began 
to consider the complex interaction of democratisation and the administration of 
justice as a governance function, both at the time of UN territorial administration 
and afterwards when the new domestic institutions assumed national responsibil-
ity. This interaction came under the loosely defined rubric of rule of law reform, 
which consistently became integrated into the strategic and operational planning 
of new peace operations. UN member states now almost universally recognise 
the establishment of the rule of law as an important aspect of peacekeeping. 
Among the primary lessons learned since the Cold War is that UN peace opera-
tions only yield a sustainable peace if new rulers were willing to respect laws and 
institutions limiting their power.16 It is commonly contended that the rule of law, 
defined by the UN as ‘a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions 
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws 
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated’,17 
depends on the obligation of political rulers to respect the law at all times at 
the expense of arbitrary or particularistic action, or wilful disobedience. Though 
constitutionalisation of independence, jurisdiction over judicial matters and the 
ability to form or join professional associations contribute to the assertion of 
independence, genuine autonomy requires more than reform of texts. Rule of 
law reconstruction is a phenomenon that defies purely institutional responses. As 
Domingos points out,
‘It would appear that the problem of judicial independence and constitutional control 
goes well beyond constitutional and legal prescriptions and reflects a deep-rooted 
lack of rule observance and law-abidingness – and long-established habits of impu-
nity and disrespect for the law.’18
It requires rulers to act against their immediate self-interest and entrenched con-
cerns. As such, autonomy is more a cultural or behavioural matter of executive 
self-restraint and constitutional sensitivity than a technical undertaking. 
 In the conditions that give rise to conflict, rulers govern in neopatrimonial-
ist fashion, claiming to rule for the common good but consider themselves de 
legibus solitus. A key test therefore of the nascent state after transition from 
conflict, oppressive rule and/or UN administration is whether judges (and indeed 
prosecutors and lawyers) can exercise truly independent judgment and command 
the respect of the new political elite for their decisions. In the long-term, the rule 
16. See generally M. Plunkett, ‘Reestablishing Law and Order in Peace-Maintenance’, 4 Glob -
al Governance (1998) p. 61.
17. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Report, supra n. 6, para. 6.
18. P. Domingos, ‘Judicial Independence and Judicial Reform in Latin America’, in A. Sched-
ler, L. Diamond and M. Plattner, eds., The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in 
New Democracies (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1999) p. 151 at p. 162.
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of law and peace will be threatened by corruption, abuses and illegality of unac-
countable rulers – a state where judicial and prosecutorial decisions are made 
solely on the basis of the law applied to the facts of a particular case and not on the 
basis of outside influence is more likely to enjoy a sustainable peace, especially 
where it serves to restrain autocratic, repressive or corrupt policy. Increasingly 
assertive UN missions have moved beyond the mere creation of stable, demo-
cratic government and have taken to heart the Madisonian recognition that where 
accountability of democratic rulers is weak, so too is the rule of law:
‘In framing a government … the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.’19
Increasingly, states transition to what are ostensibly democratic, rule of law-
based polities. In such systems, the UN promotes the subjection of rulers to 
vertical accountability where the electorate can enforce standards of good con-
duct by government at the polls.20 However, studies of the defects of third wave 
transitions to democracy have shown that elections alone are insufficient to 
curb the power of executives who frequently return to the corruption, abuses 
and plebiscitary practices of prior illiberal rule.21 Binding rulers to the law by 
other agencies such as the courts can prove a more effective check on political 
power than the vagaries of elections, where other interests inevitably cloud the 
issue. This checking process has been described as ‘horizontal accountability’ 
by O’Donnell22 and Sklar.23 Here, the courts uphold the rule of law by checking 
the validity of all enacted norms. Horizontal accountability demands a degree of 
equality in as much as we deem the judiciary, executive and legislature as equally 
worthy of respect. However, Schedler points out that if accountability is to suc-
ceed, the accounting party cannot stand on an equal footing with the accountable 
one – in its sphere of competence, the courts must be more powerful than the 
executive.24 This is the ‘paradox of accountability’ – where a specialised agency 
holds accountable actors who are immeasurably more powerful than it except in 
the narrow sphere of competence of the former. The key to horizontal account-
ability then is not equality but independence, or, more correctly, autonomy. If 
this does not exist, the courts cannot succeed in either making rulers answerable 
or enforcing their judgments. The boundaries of the courts and their decisions 
19. J. Madison, Federalist, No. 51 (1788).
20. S. Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and 
State-Building (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) pp. 126-153.
21. See for example F. Hagopian and S.P. Mainwaring, The Third Wave of Democratisation in 
Latin America: Advances and Setbacks (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2005).
22. See generally J. Méndez, G. O’Donnell, and P.S. Pinheiro, eds., The Un(Rule) of Law and 
the Underpriveleged in Latin America (Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame 1999).
23. R. Sklar, ‘Developmental Democracy’, 29 Comparative Studies in Society and History 
(1987) pp. 686-714.
24. A. Schedler, ‘Conceptualizing Accountability’, in Schedler, Diamond and Plattner, eds., 
supra n. 18, p. 13 at p. 23.
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must be respected. Encroachment through control of appointment, interference 
in criminal cases or systematic amnesty and pardon, vitiates the autonomy neces-
sary for an effective justice system. What any justice system must do is assert its 
autonomy wherever it is called into question, and insulate itself from overt politi-
cal influences that can impair the detachment of judges or prosecutors. 
2.3 Judicial autonomy and transitional justice
This concern with a culture of executive restraint vis-à-vis the courts became 
apparent in what is the UN’s most notable doctrinal document on the rule of law, 
namely the UN Secretary-General’s aforementioned Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice Report.25 Its explicit mandate was to inform the Security Council’s policy 
in such matters. Throughout the Report, the long-term prospects for adherence 
by post-conflict governments to the rule of law was tied explicitly to the success 
and example of transitional justice, a phenomenon described with appropriate 
elasticity therein as ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with 
a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, 
in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation’.26 The 
reason why successful transitional justice processes are deemed so central to 
establishing judicial autonomy is in one sense quite simple – nothing could be 
more in keeping with the independent administration of justice in the formative 
years of the state than transitional accountability for breaches of domestic and 
international law by the prior regime. Stripped of any additional utilitarian func-
tions and upholding the rule of law as a value in itself, individual accountability 
for breaches of the law uphold the regularity, stability and adherence to settled 
law the rule of law requires. Failure of enforcement, on the other hand, vitiates its 
authority and adversely affects the prospects for habitual lawfulness.27 In contrast 
with the arbitrary, politicised law of the prior regime, judgment is demonstrably 
neither political nor moral, but legal. Among the primary concerns of transitional 
justice practitioners is the notion of legacy – that the principles and practices 
of any accountability process will endure in a rule of law-based post-conflict 
state. To this end, a successful scheme of transitional criminal accountability 
will normally operate independently of countervailing political influence so as to 
normalise that independence in the long-term. 
While the link between accountability and the rule of law is obvious, the 
reason why it carries such particular normative and symbolic force in transi-
tion is because the exigencies of political transition make de-politicised trial an 
extremely difficult undertaking. Notwithstanding our intuitions about the con-
nection between accountability for the most senior human rights abusers in the 
25. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Report, supra n. 6, Preamble. 
26. Ibid., para. 8.
27. ‘[R]espect for law generally is likely to suffer if it is widely known that certain kinds of 
conduct, although nominally criminal, can be practiced with relative impunity.’ H. Packer, The 
Limits of Criminal Sanction (Stanford, Stanford University Press 1968) p. 287.
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past and the prospects for habitual obedience of the law by rulers in future, the 
experience of transitional justice in countless post-conflict states has been that 
immediate conditions are such that total or even partial accountability would 
imperil the transition by fuelling revanchism from elements of the prior regime. 
Incoming political elites are tempted to interfere with processes of criminal 
accountability national and international law requires by obstructing prosecu-
tions and passing amnesties before trial, or pardoning those convicted afterwards. 
While advocates of trials posit that states should be willing to take risks to ensure 
accountability,28 others realise that ‘many fledgling democracies have simply not 
had the power, popular support, legal tools or conditions necessary to prosecute 
effectively’.29 Transitional leniency, more so than transitional justice, is often 
the dominant paradigm – it becomes an argument for the sacrifice of the rule of 
law for its antithesis, impunity or leniency, in the interests of stability. Former 
Argentine President Alfonsin summarised the dilemma as follows:
‘Our common sense seems to support both positions; that a voluntarily committed 
act is deserving of punishment, and that the social consequences of applying this 
punishment must be considered. It would be irrational to impose a punishment when 
the consequences of doing so, far from preventing future crimes, may cause greater 
social harm than that caused by the crime itself or by the absence of punishment.’30
Zalaquett argues that new rulers in these cases may follow a commendable Webe-
rian ethical maxim of responsibility by considering the predictable consequences 
of the actions instead of an ethic of conviction about what is right.31 The majority 
of political transitions from conflict or repression to democracy have shared a 
tendency towards clemency, mass commutations of sentences and general puni-
tive forbearance in the interests of securing the transition. A danger exists where 
the example set in transitional trials may set a long-term example for treatment 
of even the most serious periodic violence that typically afflicts ‘young’ peaces. 
As such, transitional accountability can constitute a defining moment for judicial 
autonomy, establishing self-restraint on the part of the executive and assertion 
of independence by actors in the accountability process. In contrast with the 
arbitrary, politicised law of the prior regime, judgment should demonstrably be 
neither political nor moral, but legal and exemplary. As the Report put it,
‘Our experience in the past decade has demonstrated clearly that the consolidation of 
peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of peace in 
28. D. Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Legal Regime’, 100 Yale LJ (1991) pp. 2537-2615 and pp. 2548-2549. 
29. S. Landsman, ‘Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecutions 
and Truth Commissions’, 59 Law and Contemporary Problems (1996) p. 81 at p. 84.
30. Quoted in C.L. Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice Vs. Peace in 
Times of Transition (London, Frank Cass 2004) p. 1. 
31. J. Zalaquett, ‘Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of 
New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations’, 43 Hastings LJ (1992) p. 1429.
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the long-term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for 
grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement 
of disputes and the fair administration of justice. … Peace and stability can only pre-
vail if the population perceives that politically charged issues … can be addressed in 
a legitimate and fair manner.’32
2.4 Buttressing the autonomy of transitional trial
While the Report posited that criminal trials ‘contribute to greater public con-
fidence in the State’s ability and willingness to enforce the law’,33 it also noted 
the tendency of new governments towards impunity in relation to political and 
serious crimes:
‘In some cases, State authorities have been more concerned with the consolidation 
of power than with strengthening the rule of law, with the latter often perceived as a 
threat to the former.’34
Though the Report recognised that prosecutorial interference and pardon would 
still constitute threats to accountability, what is striking about the Report is the 
manner in which it echoes international transitional administration’s faith in the 
effectiveness of assuming judicial powers to promote democratic practices within 
institutions. Though the Report acknowledges the need to give ‘dedicated atten-
tion to supporting the political aspects of justice and rule of law reforms’, the 
proposed solutions to the tendency towards transitional leniency addressed more 
the institutional weakness of the inevitably ravaged justice sector than the cul-
tural and behavioural attitudes of the governments. The Report recommended that 
future peace agreements and Security Council resolutions and mandates ‘require 
that all judicial processes, courts and prosecutions be credible, fair, consistent 
with established international standards for the independence and impartiality of 
the judiciary, the effectiveness, impartiality and fairness of prosecutors and the 
integrity of the judicial process’.35 To this end, it posited that the assistance the 
UN could lend to transitional justice trials would act as a counterweight to those 
factors militating in favour of amnesty and impunity, by ‘insulating law enforce-
ment from political abuse and mobilising resources for the strengthening of the 
justice sector’.36 
 This idea of the international community or the UN using its influence to 
counter domestic tendencies towards impunity is becoming one of the dominant, 
if under-appreciated, themes in modern international law. For example, the 1998 
Rome Statute’s complementarity regime (whereby the ICC may only commence 
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proceedings where the relevant state is not investigating or prosecuting the case) 
represents a recognition that the international community has a role in stimulat-
ing or replacing the national justice system where there is an emerging impunity 
gap.37 Similarly, the internationalised elements of hybrid courts in a majority or 
minority initially alleviated fears of impartiality or lack of independence that 
would attach to otherwise purely domestic processes. While purely domes-
tic proceedings are prone to capture by political or ethnic interests, hybridised 
proceedings were initially predicted by their proponents to be ‘insulated from 
domestic political factors’38 and able to externalise the political cost of pros-
ecutions that would otherwise tempt the liberalising government to compromise 
transitional trials with leniency, amnesty or pardon.39 The Report made a strik-
ingly forceful assertion of the need for UN peace operations to over-ride national 
dispositions towards the leniency that characterised many post-conflict societies:
‘Of course, domestic justice systems should be the first resort in pursuit of account-
ability. But where domestic authorities are unwilling or unable to prosecute violators 
at home, the role of the international community becomes crucial. The establishment 
and operation of the international and hybrid court tribunals of the last decade pro-
vide a forceful illustration of that point.’40
The Report and the array of operational resolutions that followed it clearly 
emphasise the strengthening of institutions by adding international expertise in 
the period of transition over fostering behavioural change at government level or 
engagement with those political-security issues that tempt the transitional polity 
to impose fetters on the justice process.41 Though confident that the example of 
transitional trial can create a rule of law culture in future, the Report presumes that 
augmentation of the courts with neutral foreign assistance automatically serves 
to remedy reluctance on the part of the incoming regime to prosecute in the pres-
ent. The possibility that it might be necessary for international actors to engage 
assertively with the political/security calculus that compels leniency appears to 
be impliedly discounted or underplayed. As noted earlier, the belief of liberal 
interventionists in placing faith in institutional ‘fixes’ that obviate the need to 
engage forcefully with day to day politics and society is one that is increasingly 
criticised.42 The East Timorese experience in the years immediately before and 
after the Report demonstrates the limitations of such approach. The confidence 
37. Art. 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, 
2187 UNTS p. 90, 37 ILM (1998) p. 1002 (entered into force 1 July 2002). 
38. W.W. Burke-White, ‘Regionalisation of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Pre-
liminary Exploration’, 38 Texas ILJ (2003) p. 729 at p. 742.
39. Ibid.
40. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Report, supra n. 6, para. 40.
41. See, for example, Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, Rule of Law Tools 
for Post-Conflict States: Prosecution Initiatives (2006), available at: < www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/RuleoflawProsecutionsen.pdf>, at p. 1.
42. Hameiri, supra n. 12, p. 131.
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expressed therein that internationally-buttressed transitional trials would guaran-
tee an independent criminal justice process in the present, as well as exemplify 
the autonomy necessary in the future, proved misguided. International involve-
ment in the institutions of justice has ensured that investigation, prosecution and 
trial proceed with a level of competence and expertise that purely domestic pro-
ceedings could not attain. However, at the level where judicial proceedings must 
interact with executive action, internationalisation has had surprisingly little 
impact on governmental and presidential tendencies to engage in unduly selec-
tive prosecution and pardon where state security is jeopardised.
3. JUDICIAL AUTONOMY UNDER UNTAET
The UN’s response to the approximately 1400 murders and 200-250,000 forced 
deportations that resulted from the Indonesian-backed militia’s campaign of 
intimidation and revenge surrounding the September 1999 referendum was swift 
and impressive.43 The UN was presented with a power vacuum and widespread 
destruction after the Indonesian withdrawal. Acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, Security Council Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999 empow-
ered UNTAET to exercise ‘all legislative and executive authority, including the 
administration of justice’ during East Timor’s transition from Indonesian occu-
pation to full independence, given the generally accepted inability of Timorese 
actors to take over immediately.44 
3.1 Creating a judicial system ex nihilo
The UN’s conception of East Timor was that of a tabula rasa ‘empty state’ in 
terms of technical, administrative or political skills.45 Under Wilde’s schema, 
UNTAET clearly responded more to a ‘governance’ problem than a ‘sover-
eignty’ problem. Aside from its obvious role in safeguarding the new Timorese 
territorial settlement, UNTAET assumed two other roles typical of all ITAs – the 
operation of government institutions and the furtherance of democratic practices 
within them. As a result, an integral part of UNTAET’s mission was to support 
rule of law-based ‘capacity-building for self-government’.46 It was expected that 
this process would involve the establishment by UNTAET of institutions run by 
itself with a remit to prepare locals for taking control before eventually handing 
it over, in accordance with doctrinal UN peace operation reform. 
43. For a summary of these crimes, see UN Secretary-General, Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General (2000), UN Doc. A/54/726, 
21 January 2000.
44. SC Res. 1272 (1999), UN Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999), 25 October 1999, para. 1.
45. L. Jones, ‘(Post)-Colonial State-Building and State Failure in East Timor’, 10 Conflict, 
Security and Development (2010) p. 547 at p. 558.
46. SC Res. 1272, supra n. 44, Section 2(e).
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The size of the governance problem as it related to the judicial system in 
particular was readily apparent. Indeed, it was practically non-existent, a point 
which was not lost on the UN Secretary-General:
‘…local institutions, including the court system, have for all practical purposes, 
ceased to function, with … judges, prosecutors and other members of the legal pro-
fession having left the country’.47
All Indonesian or pro-autonomy judges, prosecutors, defenders and court admin-
istrators on which the justice system was dependent had fled the country after the 
referendum. There were no East Timorese professionals untainted by association 
with the prior regime who could immediately ameliorate the human resources 
deficit, bar one judge who had served in the Portuguese courts and became first 
President of the Court of Appeal.48 The physical infrastructure of the courts 
was also destroyed.49 In time, UNTAET would respond to the administrative 
vacuum by defining the applicable law,50 appointing judges51 and creating the 
District Court system in which they would operate.52 This approach in East Timor 
demonstrated the aforementioned tendency of neo-liberal interventions to con-
ceptualise the problem of state failure as essentially one of ‘human resources, 
administrative and institutional considerations’.53 UNTAET’s ‘institutionalist’ 
approach understood state-building as a predominantly technical exercise ‘of 
crafting efficient institutions and policies to create good governance’.54 While 
the UN was successful in improving the functionality of the courts as an institu-
tion of governance in the vacuum created by Indonesian withdrawal, the fears 
outlined earlier that technical advance might be made in abstraction from the 
political dynamics of state-building were realised. UNTAET and its successors 
were markedly less successful in furthering democratic relationships between the 
executive and the courts. 
The scale of the task in this regard was daunting. UNTAET was presented 
with a situation where political interference in the administration of justice was 
47. UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor, 
UN Doc. S/1999/1024, 4 October 1999, para. 33. See also Chesterman, supra n. 20, pp. 170-174.
48. See generally, H. Strohmeyer, ‘Policing the Peace: Post-Conflict Judicial Reconstruction in 
East Timor’, 24 University of New South Wales LJ (2001) p. 171.
49. Ibid., p. 172.
50. UNTAET Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in 
East Timor, Section 3(1), 27 November 1999.
51. UNTAET Regulation No. 1999/3 on the Establishment of a Transitional Judicial Service 
Commission, 3 December 1999.
52. UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Organization of Courts in East Timor, 6 March 
2000.
53. A. Rosser, ‘Rebuilding Governance in Failed States: The Case of Timor-Leste’, in 
W. Hout and R. Robison, eds., Governance and the Depoliticisation of Development (Routledge, 
London 2009) p. 169 at p. 169.
54. Jones, supra n. 45, p. 548.
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the norm. The weakness in the justice system can be traced back to Portuguese 
neglect, though the greatest damage was done when the Timorese judiciary oper-
ated either as an instrument of the Indonesian rulers in vindicating and upholding 
persecutory and discriminatory laws. As they were either excluded from the pro-
cess under Portuguese and Indonesian rule, the East Timorese had little or no 
engagement with the fair and impartial operation of law and never enjoyed de-
politicised justice. A UNDP report found:
‘[T]he Indonesian Government suborned the legal system to its own ends and cor-
rupted both courts and the judiciary in East Timor – effectively turning the legal 
system into a servile extension of the Executive.’55 
Independent experts concluded that as a result of the Indonesian administration 
of justice, the Timorese people and leadership ‘may be unclear on how a fully 
independent and accountable judiciary should function’.56
 What should have been immediately apparent given the weak capacity of the 
Timorese criminal system and the history of politicisation of criminal justice was 
the need to prepare a sphere of autonomy for the courts from the executive in the 
formative years of the new judiciary. This would serve in the long-term inter-
ests of the rule of law when UNTAET would give way to inevitably unsteady 
Timorese self-rule. However, at the time when this occurred, it was clear that 
while the institutions of justice were firmly established, a sphere of autonomy 
was not. While UN missions are intended to set a positive, empowering example 
for local populations, UNTAET itself had no separation of powers. As the Tran-
sitional Administrator Sergio Viera de Mello put it, ‘Under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter … the Administrator is authorised to impose directives and policies 
as well as use force more or less at will. There is no separation of the legislative 
or judicial from the executive authority.’57 This made it more difficult to set a 
standard of judicial autonomy. In mid-2001, UNTAET acquiesced to demands 
from the Timorese consultative National Council to allow a Cabinet Member 
for Justice to re-assign a judge to a position in the Department of Justice.58 In a 
period of ‘co-governance’ before independence, there appeared to be reluctance 
among the Timorese leadership to accept judicial autonomy, visible most notably 
55. UNDP, Ukun Rasik A’an, The Way Ahead, East Timor Human Development Report 2002, 
available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/asiathepacific/timorleste/East%20Timor_
2002_en.pdf>, at p. 39. 
56. P. Pigou, Law and Justice in East Timor – A Survey of Citizen Awareness and Attitudes 
Regarding Law and Justice in East Timor, USAID/Asia Foundation (2004), available at: <www.
asiafoundation.org/pdf/easttimor_lawsurvey.pdf>, at p. 9.
57. Quoted in J. Beauvais, ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East 
Timor’, 33 NY University of International Law and Politics (2001) p. 1101 at p. 1101.
58. Yayasan Hak Briefing Paper, ‘Serious Concerns Regarding the Independence of the Judici-
ary under the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor’ (2001), available at: <http://
members.pcug.org.au/~wildwood/01julconcerns.htm> (date accessed: 14 March 2009). 
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in the tendency of transitional cabinet ministers regularly criticise judicial deci-
sions.59 As early as 2002, the UN Secretary-General noted:
‘The functioning of Timor-Leste’s justice system, of central importance for the sta-
bility and development of the State, has been affected by a lack of clarity regarding 
the separation of powers among the judiciary, executive and legislature.’60
Any lurch on the part of the newly independent Timorese government towards 
interference with the judiciary would be entirely in keeping with the paradigm of 
executive-judiciary relations in UNTAET.
3.2 Establishing the Special Panels
The need for judicial autonomy became apparent in Resolution 1272. Referring 
to the widespread human rights abuses surrounding the referendum and recognis-
ing transitional accountability as an integral part of the administration of justice, 
it demanded ‘that those responsible for such acts be brought to justice’.61 It soon 
became apparent that Indonesia would not allow the instigators of the crimes 
be genuinely tried in either domestic or international courts. An Indonesian Ad 
Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor sat in Jakarta, while UNTAET estab-
lished a process in East Timor. The former became the paradigmatic example of 
biased domestic proceedings lacking credibility and ultimately convicted only 
one relatively low-level Timorese.62 Inside the borders of East Timor, dozens 
of militia members were held in UN custody and rapidly needed to be charged 
or released.63 When looking at the possibility of domestic serious crimes trials, 
UN Special Rapporteurs opined that the ‘as yet unformed East Timorese judicial 
system could not hope to cope with investigations into atrocities of this scale’.64 
UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 outlined the structure of a hybrid court we know as 
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes as part of a legal framework for the inves-
tigation, prosecution and trials to punish crimes that occurred between 1 January 
59. T. Jarvinen, ‘Human Rights and Post-Conflict Justice in East Timor’, UPI Working Papers 
No. 47 (2004), available at: <www.ciaonet.org/wps/fiia/0001270/0001270.pdf>, at p. 35.
60. UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mission 
of Support in East Timor, UN Doc. S/2002/1223, 6 November 2002, para. 14. In relation to the 
separation of powers, one UNMISET officer stated that the Timorese government ‘know very 
well what they are, we have to assume they choose not to implement them’. Jarvinen, supra n. 59, 
p. 35.
61. SC Res. 1272, supra n. 44, para. 16. 
62. D. Cohen, ‘Intended to Fail: The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Tribu-
nal in Jakarta’, ICTJ Occasional Paper Series (2003), available at: <www.ictj.org/images/
content/0/9/098.pdf>. 
63. B. Oswald, ‘The INTERFET Detainee Management Unit in East Timor’, 3 YIHL (2000) 
p. 347.
64. UN Secretary-General, Situation of Human Rights in East Timor: Note by the Secretary-
General, UN Doc. A/54/660, 10 December 1999, para. 72.
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and 25 October 1999. The crimes to be tried were a mix of the international (war 
crimes and crimes against humanity) and domestic (murder and rape).65
 The division of labour in the Special Panels ostensibly reconciled the UN’s 
desire to involve Timorese actors as much as possible in the process of account-
ability with a sufficient degree of control to ensure impunity would not be the 
order of the day. Each Panel was composed of three judges, two of whom were 
international with one Timorese.66 The international majority was designed to 
alleviate fears of partiality or lack of independence as regards the process on 
the part of the local population. The international judges were UN staff mem-
bers but the Special Panels functioned as part of the Dili District Court. On the 
same day as Regulation 2000/15 was passed, Regulation 2000/16 established a 
Public Prosecution Service to investigate and prosecute crimes in East Timor.67 
The Office of the General Prosecutor was headed by a Timorese. Significantly, 
directly beneath him in the hierarchy was an international, UN-appointed Deputy 
Prosecutor-General for Serious Crimes (DPGSC).68 Though the DPGSC would 
helm what was to become the investigative and prosecutorial Serious Crimes 
Unit (SCU), the holder of the position was answerable to the Timorese General 
Prosecutor, a state of affairs that looked less limiting on paper than transpired in 
reality.
The hybrid composition of the Special Panel structure and the appointment of 
an international prosecutor to run the SCU resulted more from the lack of capac-
ity in the non-existent Timorese justice system than as a response to any concerns 
over the willingness of the Timorese to pursue justice. Nevertheless, the apparent 
neutrality of international judges and prosecutors involved in the process offered 
the potential to set an example of judicial and prosecutorial independence that 
hitherto had not been seen under colonial rule. However, the first two years of 
the Panels were spent pursuing a ‘small fish strategy’ of mainly uncontroversial, 
low-level militia members already in custody.69 By the time it could turn its atten-
tion to more senior and more contentious indictees, UNTAET ceased to exercise 
exclusive power as East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002, 
with a functioning presidency and executive. UNTAET ceded responsibility to 
the less intensive peace-building missions which endure to this day, marking a 
shift from ITA to assistance missions.70 A Constitution was adopted on 22 March 
65. UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdic-
tion Over Serious Criminal Offences, UNTAET/REG/2000/15, 6 June 2000, Sections 4-9.
66. Ibid. 
67. UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/16 on the Organisation of the Public Prosecution Service 
in East Timor, UNTAET/REG/2000/16, 6 June 2000.
68. Ibid., Section 14.
69. M. Othman, Accountability for International Humanitarian Law Violations: The Case of 
Rwanda and East Timor (New York, Springer 2005) p. 112.
70. These were UNMISET (UN Mission of Support to East Timor), SC Res. 1410 (2002), UN 
Doc. S/RES/1410, 17 May 2002; UNOTIL (UN Office in East Timor), SC Res. 1599 (2005), UN 
Doc. S/RES/1599, 28 April 2005; and the more assertive UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in East 
Timor), SC Res. 1704 (2006), UN Doc. S/RES/1704, 25 August 2006.
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2002.71 East Timor became a semi-presidential republic with a one-chamber par-
liament.72 The executive was led by Mari Alkatiri’s Fretilin party, while former 
rebel leader Xanana Gusmao became President. Section 69 of the new Consti-
tution defined the principle of separation of powers, providing that ‘Organs of 
sovereignty, in their reciprocal relationship and exercise of their functions, shall 
observe the principle of separation and interdependence of powers established 
in the Constitution.’ However, in a state where the institutions of governance 
were only in the process of establishing themselves, President Gusmao enjoyed 
a personal stature as a rebel leader, prisoner of war, and source of patronage 
that gave him influence beyond the constitutional limits of his position.73 The 
Constitution also contained provisions mandating the continuance of the Special 
Panels.74 However, when the workings of the process began to contradict the 
government’s policy of rapprochement with Jakarta, previous assumptions that 
international assistance would automatically preserve the constitutional auton-
omy of the transitional trial process were shown to be faulty.
4. PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SPECIAL PANELS
The Special Panels process secured far more convictions (albeit exclusively of 
low-level militia-members) than contemporaneous processes in Sierra Leone, 
Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia,75 and helped prevent retributive violence in 
the transitional period.76 However, since the first UN-run elections in 2002 drasti-
cally weakened the UN’s influence on the administration of justice, the Timorese 
government has consistently and successfully pursued a policy of reconciliation 
with Indonesia over criminal accountability in light of Jakarta’s importance to 
economic development in the nascent state. The failure to secure accountability 
for the Indonesian military figures who organised the violence has caused con-
siderable dismay. For many in East Timor, the process was fatally compromised 
from the beginning, given that they saw Jakarta more culpable than indigenous 
collaborators.77 
71. Constitution the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, available at: <www.etan.org/
etanpdf/pdf2/constfnen.pdf>.
72. N. Duff, ‘Semi-presidentialism and Stability: Evaluating the Constitutional Design of the 
Executive in Timor Leste’, 20 Public L Rev. (2009) p. 129.
73. Jarvinen, supra n. 59, p. 62.
74. Sections 160 and 163 of the Constitution, supra n. 71.
75. Convictions were secured for 84 out of 87 defendants who came before the Special Panels. 
76. Report to Secretary-General of the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of 
Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (then East Timor)in 1999, UNSCOR, Annex 
II, UN Doc. S/2005/458, 25 May 2005, Executive Summary, para. 8 (hereinafter: Commission of 
Experts).
77. P. Pigou, Crying Without Tears – In Pursuit of Justice and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste: 
Community Perspectives and Expectations, ICTJ (2003), available at: <www.ictj.org/images/
content/0/9/096.pdf>, at p. 33.
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4.1 Dili-Jakarta relations and the lenient tendency
The indifference of the government to the people’s demand for justice might 
best be explained by then-President Gusmao’s declaration that ‘the relation-
ship between Timor-Leste and Indonesia is far too important for any issue that 
might arise to discourage us or to derail this relationship’.78 The government’s 
first National Development Plans identified the reduction of poverty and promo-
tion of economic growth as the primary goals for what remains a significantly 
underdeveloped country, and this focus retains its supremacy.79 Indonesia has 
continued to be East Timor’s main trading partner and supplies 80 per cent of 
its energy and food, and as such is critical to the Timorese social stability. In 
addition to economics, security remains a concern. Though relations with Indo-
nesia have generally been excellent, Jakarta still exerts a subtle threat. Though 
borders between the two countries are mostly agreed, a contentious 3 per cent of 
the border yields a number of disputes every year.80 Though the liberalisation of 
Indonesia has continued at a steady pace with direct elections and decentralisa-
tion, military figures still exert ‘inordinate influence’.81 Many militia members 
remain free in West Timor. 
 Because trade and security are dependent on normalisation of relations with 
Jakarta, of greatest concern to the East Timorese leadership has been the chance 
that Indonesian democratisation and reconciliation could be reversed. As a result, 
it pragmatically promotes political reconciliation rather than prosecutorial justice. 
A democratic government ruling freely of overt control by the very people who 
organised the repression in 1999 is very much in Dili’s security interests. The 
possibility of trying military figures is widely considered to have the potential to 
set back these advances. As then-Foreign Minister Horta puts it, the Zalaquettian 
choice for East Timor was as follows:
‘What is more important for us? That democracy is slowly consolidated in Indone-
sia? Or the blind pursuit of justice at the expense of stability in Indonesia?’82
78. F.D. Unidjaja, ‘Dili Says Relations With RI More Important Than Justice’, Jakarta Post, 
5 March 2003. 
79. Planning Commission, National Development Plan (2002), available at: <http://sitere
sources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Timor-Leste_PRSP(may2002).pdf>.
80. International Crisis Group, ‘Timor-Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border’, Asia Brief-
ing No. 104, 30 May 2010, available at: <www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/
timor-leste/B104%20Timor-Leste%20-%20Oecusse%20and%20the%20Indonesian%20Border.
ashx>, at pp. 3-4. 
81. J. Joliffe, ‘Compromising Justice in East Timor’, Far Eastern Economic Review, April 
2006, p. 99. See also, E. Schneier, ‘Reformasi and the Indonesian “War on Terror”: State, Military 
and Legislative-Executive Relations in an Emerging Democracy’, 15 Journal of Legislative Stud-
ies (2009) p. 294.
82. José Ramos-Horta, quoted in E. Nakashima, ‘Truth buried in unknown grave’, The Stan-
dard, 23 September 2005. 
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Indonesia, for their part, was extremely keen to quell calls for genuine account-
ability.83 Under pressure from Jakarta, the Timorese government went beyond 
reconciliatory measures, moving from unwillingness to pursue justice to vocal 
opposition.84 In March 2005, prior to the conclusion of the Specials Panels two 
months later, a Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF) was established by 
both governments. The terms of reference overtly stated it would seek ‘truth and 
promote friendship as a new and unique approach rather than the prosecutorial 
process’ and that the process would not lead to prosecutions.85 The CTF was criti-
cised by observers for ‘insufficiently cross-examining or questioning individuals 
who were allegedly involved or bear responsibility for the 1999 violence’.86 The 
Report of the Commission has been criticised for being too exculpatory of Jakar-
ta’s role since the end of Portuguese decolonisation.87 Timorese rapprochement 
with Indonesia can be understood as a prioritisation of tangible trade and secu-
rity guarantees essential to the socio-economic development that builds peace 
over the metaphysical benefits of transitional justice, a trade-off that to a degree 
accorded with some public opinion.88 It is beyond the remit of this article to 
consider whether the rapprochement policy of the government is correct or not, 
though subsequent events in 2006 and 2008 (examined in section 5) demonstrate 
the fragility of East Timor and retrospectively cast the prioritiation of stability 
at all costs in a more understandable light. Nevertheless, the stated policy of the 
UN in forming internationalised tribunals and in the Rule of Law Report is that 
leniency in relation to the punishment of crimes under international law, however 
understandable in the individual circumstances of each case, is intolerable under 
the global rule of law it promotes. As will be seen, practice contradicted theory. 
 As noted earlier, transitional justice is inherently politically transformative, 
but legality demands independence from political pressure. The supposition is 
normally that the bench, being the ultimate arbiter in criminal proceedings, would 
be the most likely to attract (if not the most susceptible to) political interference 
83. General Sutarto, Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, put it thus: ‘Today’s Indonesia is 
now embarked in the process of democratisation … all we ask from Timor-Leste is to understand 
our effort and not to disturb the democratic political environment we are trying to consolidate.’ 
Quoted by Xanana Gusmao, Speech of His Excellency Xanana Gusmao on the Occasion of the 
Handing Over of the Final Report of the CAVR to the National Parliament, 28 November 2005. 
84. K. Askin, S. Starr and S. Frease, Unfulfilled Promises: Achieving Justice for Crimes 
Against Humanity in East Timor’, Open Society Justice Initiative and Coalition for Interna-
tional Justice (2004), available at: <www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/1104unfulfilled.pdf>, at 
pp. 46-47. 
85. Terms of Reference for the East Timor/Indonesia Commission for Truth and Friendship, 
available at: <www.etan.org/et2005/march/06/10tor.htm>, Art. 10.
86. UNMIT Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section, Report on Human Rights Devel-
opments in Timor-Leste, August 2006-August 2007 (2007), available at: <www2.ohchr.org/
SPdocs/Countries/UNMITAug0607.doc>, at p. 28.
87. M. Hirst, Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth: Monitoring Report on the Commission 
of Truth and Friendship in Indonesia and Timor-Leste, ICTJ (2008), available at: <www.ictj.org/
images/content/7/7/772.pdf>.
88. Pigou, supra n. 77, p. 35.
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or pressure. It is for this reason that a majority of international judges was deemed 
imperative in politically-sensitive trials in Kosovo, Lebanon and Sierra Leone. In 
the Timorese context, the perceived political dangers emanating from the process 
would not come from the Special Panel judges because Indonesia would never 
extradite its citizens to trial in its former colony. Jakarta had no express legal 
obligation to co-operate with UNTAET under Security Council Resolution 1272 
and so refused to abide by the commitments entered into in a Memorandum of 
Understanding with UNTAET on co-operation in judicial affairs, which included 
enforcement of extradition and arrest warrants.89 However, the policy of rap-
prochement would be jeopardised if and when the SCU switched its attention 
from the aforementioned ‘small fish’ strategy to inevitably embarrassing pros-
ecution of senior suspects in the Indonesian military hierarchy. It is regrettable 
that more progress in prosecuting senior Indonesian officials was not made while 
UNTAET administered the country and could exercise greater influence over 
Timorese actors before May 2002, given its near-monopoly of power. Histori-
cally, where the transition to liberal rule is introduced exogenously by a foreign 
power such as the UN, opportunity for rigorous, trial-based punishment senior 
leaders is greatest.90 By the time action was taken in 2003, this opportunity was 
greatly diminished. When this occurred, the government subjected the Timorese 
Office of the Prosecutor-General (to whom the SCU ultimately reported) to 
interference to the degree that pursuit of the indictments to their conclusion was 
abandoned. While such restraining impulses were envisaged in the Rule of Law 
Report, the manner in which the UN acquiesced to such interference was not. 
4.2 The Wiranto et al. Indictment
Section 4.2 of Regulation 2000/16 governing the SCU provided that prosecutors 
‘shall act without bias and prejudice and … without improper influence, direct 
and indirect, from any source, whether within or outside the civil administration 
of East Timor’. On 24 February 2003, the SCU issued the indictment of eight 
high-level figures including Indonesian General Wiranto, who at the time was 
expected to (and subsequently did) run as presidential candidate for Indonesia’s 
biggest party, Golkar.91 The indictment included more than 280 murders and 
ten major attacks both before and after the popular consultation. The Timorese 
government quickly began to distance itself from it. President Xanana Gusmao 
issued a public statement criticising the Prosecutor-General Longuinhos Mon-
teiro for not consulting him (no such consultation was legally necessary) and 
went on to state that it was not in the national interest, reaffirming that since 
89. The Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Indonesia and the UNTAET 
Regarding the Co-Operation in Legal, Judicial and Human Rights-Related Matters, 6 April 2000, 
Official Gazette of East Timor, UNTAET/GAZ/2000/Add.2, p. 93. 
90. J. Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2004) p. 49.
91. Case No. 05/2003. 
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‘relations with Indonesia are of extreme importance, not only for current stabil-
ity, but for the future of the country’.92 The Prosecutor-General, who also served 
in government as Attorney General, was initially supportive of the indictments 
but then performed an ‘about-face’, claiming the indictment was not instigated 
by Timorese and instead was the policy of international actors in the SCU.93 
UNMISET, the successor to UNTAET then denied responsibility for the indict-
ments, transferring it to the East Timorese when the Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary-General (SRSG) stated:
‘While indictments are prepared by international staff, they are issued under the legal 
authority of the Timorese Prosecutor-General. The United Nations does not have any 
legal authority to issue indictments.’94 
At a later briefing to the press on the same day, a UN spokesman stated to report-
ers: ‘We hope that in future you’ll say “East Timor indicts” and not “the United 
Nations indicts”.’95 Though this position was technically correct, the denial was 
hardly in keeping with the principle of fearlessly and impartially pursuing jus-
tice that the UN both professed to abide by and, more importantly, aspired to 
inculcate in East Timor. While the hybrid nature of the Special Panels apparatus 
should in theory have liberated the UN to robustly assert the independence of the 
Timorese prosecutor in the interests of setting an example for the future exercise 
of the prosecutorial function in the nascent state, the will was significantly lack-
ing. 
 On 10 May 2004, the arrest warrant for the indictment, was issued by an 
American Special Panels judge. Though President Gusmao professed to respect 
the independence of the SCU and the independent nature of the courts in the 
Constitution as an organ of sovereignty,96 it was factually established that on 
issuance of the indictment, Monteiro was summoned to his office.97 On 17 May, 
the Special Panel rejected the Prosecutor-General’s motion under the Panels’ 
Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking a retraction of the warrant on 
the basis that no grounds were provided to amend the indictment.98 President 
Gusmao also criticised the arrest warrant, and in a public repudiation of the SCU, 
92. ‘East Timor: Serious Crimes Unit Indicts 48 More Suspects’, UN Wire, 1 March 2003. 
93. C. Reiger and M. Wierda, The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect, ICTJ 
Case Studies Series (2006), available at: <www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Timor.study.pdf>, at 
p. 33.
94. UNMISET Press Release, ‘Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste’, 25 February 2003. 
95. Journalist Jill Jolliffe alleges that the SRSG requested the DPGSC to take the Wiranto 
Indictment off the UN letterhead (J. Jolliffe, ‘Timor PM Slams UN on War Criminals’, Asian 
Times, 15 May 2003).
96. Othman, supra n. 69, pp. 127-128.
97. Commission of Experts, supra n. 76, para. 71.
98. Deputy Prosecutor-General for Serious Crimes v. Wiranto and Others, Case No. 05/2003, 
Decision on the Motion of the Prosecutor General to Review and Amend the Indictment, 17 May 
2004.
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met with Wiranto in Bali and hugged him.99 No arrest warrants issued by the 
Special Panels were subsequently forwarded to Interpol by Monteiro. No more 
progress was ever made in prosecuting the organisers of the referendum violence.
 The Prosecutor-General’s actions in the Wiranto episode clearly show how 
political obstruction by the Timorese government took precedence over the 
independent exercise of his responsibilities, notwithstanding the infusion of 
international support. A report by a Commission of Experts established to review 
the Special Panels demonstrated how little influence internationalisation of the 
unit he headed served to counter-balance government policy:
‘The Commission has benefited from a frank discussion with the Prosecutor-Gen-
eral. Dr. Monteiro advises that he faces extraordinary challenges in both support-
ing the SCU and at the same time managing his Office with an eye to Government 
policy. … [S]ince his government has to support the arrest and transfer of suspects 
outside Timor-Leste, he has to take the Government’s policies into consideration. He 
denies direct interference in the work of the SCU, but has been advised that his inter-
nal policies cannot be inconsistent with those of the State.’100
In promoting and deferring to nationally-led strategies of transitional justice, the 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Report (which was being drafted at the 
time) accepted the danger that this might manifest itself in leniency and amnesty, 
and so re-iterated the UN’s role in negating the short-term self-interest in impu-
nity. The Wiranto et al. episode constituted an accumulation of events envisaged 
in the Report – the UN investigates a crimes in a third state, identifies those who 
should be made accountable under international criminal law, the prosecution of 
whom occasions opposition from the leadership of the state concerned. However, 
the faith expressed in the Report and implied in the UN’s support for interna-
tionalised courts and tribunals that an infusion of foreign staff could effectively 
counteract national reluctance to pursue destabilising prosecutions proved unduly 
optimistic. While the internationalisation of judicial responses to past human 
rights abuses was designed to preclude the possibility that government policy 
could impinge on the administration of justice, a UN Commission of Experts 
appointed to review the Serious Crimes Process baldly concluded that the Office 
of the Prosecutor-General could not function independently of the government, 
regardless of the weight of supranational influence on prosecution policy.101 
 From a peace-building perspective, the toleration of political interference in 
the trials was antithetical to the expectation that transitional trials would exem-
plify the rule of law, not men, in the formative years of the new state. The faith 
placed in transitional trials as a rule of law tool is largely explained by the exam-
ple set of independent and autonomous judgment of politically-sensitive crimes 
(where previously the norm was interference and impunity) to draw the most 
99. Askin, Frease and Starr, supra n. 84, p. 40. 
100. Commission of Experts, supra n. 76, para. 69.
101. Ibid., Executive Summary, para. 12.
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public line possible between the courts’ beholden past and more autonomous 
future.102 Frease appeared to summarise the UN’s position in East Timor at the 
time when she argued that the failure to pursue accountability for the Indonesian 
figures most responsible for the crimes of 1999 ‘are rooted in politics, not the rule 
of law’.103 However, this position is untenable – the overt interference of politics 
into the constitutionally independent functions of an institution of the justice sys-
tem is the core rule of law issue in a state where such interference has historically 
been the norm. A key principle of UN peacebuilding doctrine is that such selec-
tive and security-contingent enforcement of the law, even where motivated by 
concern for the repercussions of an action on the emergent peace, unacceptably 
blurs the difference between legal judgment and political decision-making.104 Far 
from setting a standard of judicial independence, the experience of governmental 
interference with the institutions of justice is one that has been repeated in the 
years since the Special Panels ended in 2005. It begs the question of whether the 
Wiranto episode has served to legitimise the practice. 
 It is tempting to wonder how the indictment might have fared under 
UNTAET’s exclusive administration of the courts before May 2002 and to query 
whether the failure to do so itself represents a fear of political contestation. 
One inference to be drawn from the episode is that as the UN helps develop the 
capacities and legitimacy of post-conflict governments and progressively weak-
ens its own peace-building missions in situ, it becomes gradually less able to 
resist the compromises of transition that peace-building doctrine and the Rule 
of Law Report declare themselves so opposed to. Rule of law reconstruction 
might fit the logic of peace-building and democratisation, but the timetable of 
peace-building and democratisation do not necessarily complement transitional 
justice. While a perceived national interest in restraining accountability or par-
doning socially divisive crimes may remain constant, the UN’s asserted ability to 
over-ride it does not. Perhaps an explanation for the reluctance of UNTAET and 
UNMISET to interfere in the justice system was the need to justify the significant 
power they wielded as neutral, uncolonial and apolitical, given repeated criti-
cisms that their structures were neo-monarchical105 and a benevolent despotism.106 
As UNMISET’s successor missions replicated the UN’s tendency to conceive 
of ongoing capacity-building processes as technocratic forms of ‘anti-politics’,107 
such timidity would become the norm in future.
102. J. Mendez, ‘In Defence of Transitional Justice’, in J.A. McAdams, ed., Transitional Jus-
tice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies (Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame 
Press 1997) p. 1 at p. 1.
103. S. Frease, ‘Playing Hide and Seek With Justice: What Went Wrong in Indonesia and East 
Timor’, 10 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law (2004) p. 283 at p. 283.
104. R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal 
Law Regime (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2005) p. 196.
105. J. Chopra, ‘The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor’, 43 Survival (2000) p. 27.
106. Beauvais, supra n. 57, p. 1101. 
107. K. Jayasuriya and K. Hewison, ‘The Antipolitics of Good Governance’, 36 Critical Asian 
Studies (2004) p. 571. 
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5. THE NORMALISATION OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, 
 2006-2011
The judicial structure in East Timor is largely the same as that instituted by 
UNTAET in 2000 and consists of a Court of Appeal and four District Courts.108 
However, since the end of the Special Panel trials, the Timorese courts have 
required transfusions of international assistance on the bench and in the Office of 
the Prosecutor. Because for most of the relevant period there were only thirteen 
national judges and fourteen national prosecutors,109 the hybridity visible in the 
Special Panels recurred: 
‘Despite … remarkable progress, however, the judicial system is likely to remain 
dependent on international judges and public prosecutors, especially at higher levels, 
and on international mentoring programmes for some time.’110
As a result, foreign transfusions of assistance have remained a feature of the 
Timorese justice system years after the conclusion of formal territorial admin-
istration, though not always on the strict 2:1 basis of the Special Panels. While 
some judges are UN employees, the organisation primarily coordinates exchange 
staff from donor countries.111 Indeed, far from gradually phasing out interna-
tional involvement and empowering local lawyers and judges as was originally 
expected, the Special Panels served more to ground a norm whereby the more 
serious and divisive a crime is, the less likely it was that Timorese lawyers and 
judges will exercise ownership over the prosecution or trial of them. Independent 
UN observers warned against the dangers of a dependency syndrome,112 though 
the fact that a full panel of Timorese judges tried the presidential assassination 
case (examined later) is an encouraging sign.113 
108. UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Organisation of Courts in East Timor, 
UNTAET/REG/2000/11, 6 March 2000.
109. P. Rapoza, et al., The Justice System of Timor-Leste: An Independent Comprehensive 
Needs Assessment (2009), available at: <www.scribd.com/doc/21945587/Justice-System-in-East-
Timor-An-Independent-Comprehensive-Needs-Assessment-2009>, at pp. 30 and 35. Since 2009, 
there have been a total of 51 judges, prosecutors and defence counsel. 
110. UN Secretary-General, Report of the UN Secretary-General on UNMIT (for the period 
from 27 January to 20 August 2007), UN Doc. S/2007/513, 28 August 2007, para. 35. At the most 
recent estimate, there is backlog of 4847 pending cases, though international actors are being 
slowly moved out of ‘line functions’. UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 21 September 2010 to 
7 January 2011), UN Doc. S/2011/32, 25 January 2011, paras. 40 and 43 (hereinafter: UN Secre-
tary-General 2011 Report).
111. UN Secretary-General 2010 Report, supra n. 1, para. 89.
112. UNDP Mid-term Evaluation Team, UNDP Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-
Leste Programme: Independent/External Mid-Term Evaluation Report, September 2007, available 
at: <erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=1460>, at p. 59. 
113. OHCHR, Facing the Future: Periodic Report on Human Rights Developments in Timor-
Leste: 1 July 2009-30 June 2010, available at: <http://unmit.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIT/
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 In short, ever since the Special Panels process ended, the UN has found itself 
repeating its Special Panels-era role in investigating, punishing and convicting 
politically-motivated violence as the divisions of the Indonesian occupation give 
way to a ‘relapsing’ democracy where divisions emerge over power and patron-
age.114 In theory, this constitutes a strong position in which to repair the damage 
of the Wiranto episode and lend force and example to the constitutional provi-
sions on the rule of law.115 However, notwithstanding East Timor’s dependence 
on international actors to administer justice, familiar patterns of interference on 
the part of a government prioritising stability over all else have re-appeared on 
a consistent basis to frustrate internationally-driven processes of accountability. 
Much like the Special Panels period saw President Gusmao elevate bilateral rela-
tions with Jakarta above the pursuit of justice, the past five years of instability 
have seen a his successor prioritise the importance of fostering ‘national unity 
and dialogue’ over accountability.116 Utilising the same stability-based argu-
ments that traditionally animate transitional leniency, prosecutorial interference 
remains the norm, while a systematic policy of pardon applies to those convicted 
of serious crimes. These trends are most apparent in the 2006 Crisis and the 
attempted assassinations of the President and Prime Minister.
5.1 The 2006 Crisis
What is widely labelled ‘the 2006 Crisis’ began as a conflict within and between 
elements of the military (F-FDTL) and police (PNTL) of East Timor over dis-
crimination within their ranks, and expanded to feature general violence that 
convulsed the country intermittently for a month.117 The spark for the violence 
was a four-day demonstration from 24-28 April 2006 in Dili between a group 
of army soldiers who alleged discrimination by their superiors. The most seri-
ous crimes were committed when internecine violence resumed between 22-25 
May between elements of the police, military and non-state paramilitary groups, 
a conflict which itself may stem from the UN’s reconstruction of the security 
institutions in isolation from Timorese politics and society to ensure its profes-
sionalism.118 Australian army and police personnel were deployed to quell the 
Crisis. The events in late April and late May must be kept in perspective. There 
were isolated bursts of serious violence, but it never constituted a rebellion or 
Human%20Rights/UNHR%20Report%202010%20for%20website.pdf>, at p. 19.
114. Myrtinnen, supra n. 5, p. 219.
115. Section 119 provides that Courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and 
the law.
116. UN Secretary-General 2011 Report, supra n. 110, para. 2. 
117. See generally Sp ecial Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Report of the United 
Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste (2006), available at <www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/COITimorLeste.pdf>.
118. Jones, supra n. 45, p. 561; D. Kingsbury, ‘Policing, Rule of Law, State Capacity and Sus-
tainable Peace in Timor-Leste’, 14 Journal of International Peacekeeping (2010) p. 353.
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civil war. Nonetheless, in addition to 38 killed and 69 injured, 1650 houses 
were destroyed and 150,000 people were internally displaced.119 The latter sta-
tistic may seem extreme given the overall violence, but it can be explained by 
‘a deeply ingrained fear of any form of political contention’ in East Timor after 
the widespread internecine violence at the time of Portuguese decolonisation and 
what happened in 1999.120 The fear of instability visible in the Special Panels 
process was both justified and magnified by the events of 2006. What is particu-
larly significant is the extent to which agencies of the state and senior Fretilin 
(government) politicians were found to be complicit in the most serious violence, 
most notably the illegal distribution of weapons by the Ministers of the Interior 
and of Defence to non-state paramilitary groups and competing factions within 
the police and army.121 
 Political, ‘vertical’ accountability followed immediately. Prime Minister 
Alkatiri and Interior Minister Lobato were forced to resign over distribution of 
arms to civilians. Efforts to reform the army and police began immediately with 
international assistance. Alkatiri was succeeded by non-Fretilin Foreign Minis-
ter Jose Ramos-Horta as Prime Minister. Ramos-Horta later swapped jobs with 
his ally President Gusmao after elections in 2007 in which Fretilin was soundly 
defeated. However, ‘horizontal’ judicial accountability was paramount. As with 
the 1999 violence, the UN Secretary-General mandated a special UN Commis-
sion of Inquiry to ‘clarify responsibility’ for the aforementioned crimes. To this 
end, the Commission named about 60 individuals using a standard of ‘reasonable 
suspicion’, defined as ‘a reliable body of material consistent with other verified 
circumstances tending to show that a person may reasonably be suspected of 
involvement in the commission of a crime’.122 The violence was aptly explained 
by the Commission of Inquiry as being the product of the weaknesses of the 
nascent Timorese state, finding that ‘The Crisis that occurred in Timor-Leste 
between 28 April and 25 May can be explained largely by the frailty of state 
institutions and the weakness of the rule of law.’123 
 The task set for the hybridised units of the Timorese justice sector was to 
investigate, prosecute, defend and try individuals recommended for prosecution 
by the Special Commission of Inquiry. Imbibing the doctrine of the Rule of Law 
Report, the Commission stated that these tasks ‘should be viewed as the foun-
dation upon which the capacity-building and strengthening of State institutions 
should rest’.124 Acknowledging the interference in the Special Panels process, the 
UN was advised by independent justice system monitors that prosecution of 2006 
Crisis crimes be carried out by international actors, reasoning that ‘although the 
119. Special Commission of Inquiry, supra n. 117, para. 101.
120. UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1690 (2006), UN Doc. S/2006/628, 8 August 2006, para. 31. 
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Prosecutor-General himself is not active in individual prosecutions, the fact that 
he retains the ultimate control of the prosecution service means that the prosecu-
tion service as a whole is vulnerable to political pressure’.125 Internationalisation 
of the judicial response was once more urged to militate against political interfer-
ence or disregard for judgments:
‘The use of international judges, prosecutors and defenders operating within the 
domestic legal system accompanied by the Timorese actors is the main venue to 
ensure accountability. … For such to occur, significant reliance should be placed on 
international judges, prosecutors and public defenders in order to secure the capacity, 
independence and impartiality of those involved in this process.’126
As in the Special Panels, the initial prospects for accountability looked healthy 
when in May 2007, the Court of Appeal with an international majority confirmed 
the conviction of Minister Lobato for the crimes of murder and weapons offenc-
es.127 The convictions were commended as ‘a very positive step for the future of 
development of the legal system in Timor-Leste’128 and as ‘important signals to 
the population that Timor-Leste is committed to applying the law in an impartial 
manner and to combating impunity’.129 
 The optimism occasioned by the arrest and trial of Minister Lobato that 
the law would be applied to all equally, regardless of power and influence, was 
dashed in the following months and years. Systematic restraint of the prosecution 
function and pardon became the dominant governmental responses to the inves-
tigations recommended by the Commission of Inquiry. Pursuant to Article 85(i) 
of the Constitution, the President of the Republic can grant pardons and commute 
sentences after consultation with the government, and this avenue is one that 
has consistently been pursued.130 Adopting the language of transitional leniency 
(‘To know how to forgive is a virtue that we need to cultivate in our hearts. Let 
us recognise the day of pardon and clemency among Timorese’),131 Presidential 
Decree No. 53/2008 of 19 May 2008 provided that named convicts, among them 
Lobato and a number of people convicted for crimes against humanity by the 
125. Judicial Systems Monitoring Programme, ‘JSMP Submission to the UN Independent Spe-
cial Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, September 2006’ (copy on file with author).
126. Council of Coordination for the Justice Sector, ‘Additional Needs of the Timor-Leste 
Justice System: Upholding Service Delivery in the Timor-Leste Justice System During the Crisis’ 
(2006), p. 13 (copy on file with author).
127. Judicial Systems Monitoring Programme Justice Update (Press Release), ‘Appeal Deci-
sion in the Case of Rogerio Lobato’, 17 May 2007.
128. Judicial Systems Monitoring Programme Press Release, ‘Rogerio Tiago Lobato Sen-
tenced to 7 Years 6 Months Prison’, 8 March 2007.
129. UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Inte-
grated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 21 August 2007 to 7 January 2008), UN Doc. 
S/2008/26, 17 January 2008, para. 31.
130. It provides: ‘It is exclusively incumbent upon the President of the Republic: … i) To 
grant pardons and commute sentences after consultation with the Government.’
131. ‘East Timor minister to be pardoned’, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 April 2008. 
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Special Panels, were entitled to either pardons or commutations of sentence.132 
Indeed, more than half the total prison population received pardons or commuted 
sentences,133 including the last of the 84 militia members convicted by the Special 
Panels who had not already enjoyed earlier presidential commutations.134 As one 
Timorese justice NGO pointed out at the time,
‘The Amnesty Law [sic] is more political than judicial in nature and appears to have 
been created and approved with the intention of protecting certain individuals and 
groups who wish to evade prosecution.’135
A similar reluctance to pursue accountability for paramilitary violence was seen 
in the case of senior army and police figures found by the Commission of Inquiry 
and international prosecutors to be responsible for many of the offences commit-
ted in the Crisis. The November 2007 sentences of between ten and twenty years 
given to four soldiers by the Dili District Court for the murder of eight unarmed, 
surrendering police officers during the Crisis was commuted by the President in 
2010.136 The commutations ‘were purposely calculated to result in the immediate 
release’ of the soldiers, and effectively constituted pardons.137 Once more, the 
language of reconciliation was used – ‘Our State offers a gift of reconciliation in 
order to place in the past the sadness and pain that the crisis of 2006 caused our 
country.’138 The Minister of Defence and the Commander of the Defence Forces 
have never been indicted despite being recommended for prosecution on charges 
of illegal weapons transfer by the Commission of Inquiry.139 There is evidence 
of executive restraint of prosecutorial activities in investigations of political fig-
ures allied to the Gusmao/Horta axis.140 As with the Special Panels, the more 
132. Presidential Decree No. 53/2008, text available at: <www.eastimorlawjournal.org/Presi-
dential_Decrees/Decree_of_the_President_53_of_2008_presidential_pardons.html> (accessed 5 
August 2009) Arts. 1, 2 and 4.
133. UNOHCHR, Report on Human Rights Developments in Timor-Leste: The Security Sector 
and Access to Justice, 1 September 2007-30 June 2008, available at: <www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Countries/UNMIT200808.pdf>, at p. 12, para. 45.
134. L. Mallinder, ‘Amnesty Law, Trials and the Promise of Complementarity?’, Transitional 
Justice Institute Research Paper No. 10-10 (2010), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1630418>, at p. 27.
135. Judicial Systems Monitoring Programme Justice Update, ‘The Amnesty Law Protects 
Perpetrators of Crimes Committed During the 2006-2007 Crisis’, June 2007. 
136. Presidential Decree No. 31/2010. 
137. Center for International Governance Initiative (CIGI), Security Sector Reform Monitor 
Timor-Leste No. 4 (2011), available at: <www.cigionline.org/publications/2011/1/security-sector-
reform-monitor-timor-leste>, at p. 4.
138. Ibid.
139. Special Commission of Inquiry, supra n. 117, para. 134. 
140. International Crisis Group, Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, Asia Report No. 143 
(2008), available at: <www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/timor-leste/143_
timor_leste___security_sector_reform.ashx>, at p. 18; UN Secretary General 2010 Report, supra 
n. 1, para. 11.
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senior the offender, the less likely it was that he would come before the courts. 
The disregard for the autonomy of the judicial institutions the UN helped build 
has had a chilling effect on prosecutions and trials. At the time of writing, out 
of the approximately 60 Crisis-related investigations launched with significant 
international assistance in the Crisis offences, not a single individual remains in 
detention after nine pardoned convictions and 43 acquittals.141 Observers cred-
ibly posit ‘a lack of motivation on the judges’ part to properly conduct full trials 
due to the certainty of presidential pardons’.142
5.2 The February 2008 attacks
On the morning of 11 February 2008, the President was shot twice and almost 
killed by rebel intruders under the leadership of one Major Alfredo Reinado. 
Reinado’s deputy Lieutenant Gastao Salsinha and some of his followers fired on 
a column of vehicles containing Prime Minister Gusmao, with a similar lack of 
success.143 Reinado was a soldier whose prosecution was recommended by the 
Commission of Inquiry after he and his followers attacked police and army offi-
cers, killing five and injuring ten in violence during the 2006 Crisis.144 Reinado, 
initially a supporter of the President, had gone on the run and was furnished 
‘freedom of movement’ letters by the President and Prosecutor-General order-
ing Australian and UN military and police to cease the hunt for him, which were 
declared invalid by an international judge in the District Court.145 Reinado was 
killed in the attack. The episode once more brought home the weakness of the 
rule of law most dramatically. It has been widely suggested that the apparent 
state policy to tolerate political violence with restraint of the prosecutorial func-
tion and systematic pardon emboldened the attackers. For example, Amnesty 
International argued:
‘The attempted killings of President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao yes-
terday are a direct consequence of this continuing failure of the government and the 
international community to rebuild the national criminal and civil justice system 
effectively. Alfredo Reinado, who was facing criminal charges for having taken part 
in the 2006 violence, shouldn’t have been still at large, threatening the stability of the 
country.’146
141. CIGI, supra n. 137, p. 14.
142. Ibid.
143. S. Mydans and T. Johnston, ‘President of East Timor Wounded in Rebel Attack’, New 
York Times, 11 February 2008.
144. Special Commission of Inquiry, supra n. 117, para. 117.
145. ‘East Timor’s acting Prime Minister halts search for fugitive rebel soldier’, Associated 
Press, 23 April 2007.
146. Amnesty International Press Release, ‘Timor-Leste: End Culture of Impunity’, 12 March 
2008, available at: <www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/timor-leste-end-culture-impu
nity-20080212>.
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As in 1999 and 2006, investigations and prosecutions were restrained by the 
government. A leaked UN report found the National Investigation Department, 
augmented by an international prosecutor, had encountered ‘political and mili-
tary interference’, as well as a lack of cooperation from the government.147 On 
3 March 2010, 24 defendants were found guilty of committing crimes and were 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from nine years and four months to 
sixteen years.148 The court held that the defendants, together with the deceased 
Reinado, were illegally armed to carry out attempted murders. However, it 
appeared at all stages that trial would be futile because any punishment handed 
down by the hybridised Dili District Court convened to try them would be cir-
cumvented by a government keen to make peace with the rebels. Over a year 
before the trial in February 2009, President Ramos-Horta appeared to perpetuate 
the climate of impunity and political interference by making clear any convic-
tions by the courts would be negated:
‘I met Mr. Salsinha and some of his friends and I don’t want them to be held respon-
sible for the crisis that occurred because they weren’t the leaders. I can’t give a 
pardon before the legal process is done. After the legal process I can give a pardon, 
but before that I can’t do anything.’149 
Within what should have been the courts’ sole sphere of competence, the Presi-
dent of the Court of Appeal found himself in the invidious position of calling on 
the President to delay the inevitable grant of pardon until after it heard the defen-
dants’ appeal.150 Ultimately, the aforementioned pardon for the four soldiers 
on 20 August 2010 also included Salsinha and the rest of Reinado’s followers 
involved in the attacks.151 Again, the language of reconciliation and stabilisa-
tion was used. President Horta justified the pardon by reference to the need to 
‘strengthen national unity’, adding that ‘The Petitioners and Salsinha were vic-
tims as well. So after some discussions with the Government and Opposition 
Leaders I have decided to end the 2006 problem.’152 
147. UNMIT Internal Review Panel, Report on the UN Actions in Response to the Attacks on 
the President and the Prime Minister on 11 February 2008 (2008), para. 99 (unpublished, pre-
viously available on wikileaks, copy on file with author). Discussed on ABC Radio Australia, 
11 August 2008, transcript available at: <http://timorleste.livejournal.com/155590.html>. 
148. No transcript in English for the case exists. For a summary, see Judicial Systems Moni-
toring Programme Press Release, ‘Final decision issued by court in 11 February case fails to prove 
who shot the President of the Republic’, 10 May 2010, available at: <http://easttimorlegal.blogs
pot.com/2010/05/jsmp-final-decision-issued-by-court-in.html>. 
149. N. Da Cruz, ‘E Timor on a knife-edge one year after President’s shooting’, Gulf Times, 
11 February 2009. 
150. CIGI, supra n. 137, p. 6. 
151. Presidential Decree No. 31/2010. 
152. ‘Ramos-Horta Pardons Attackers’, East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin, 24 August 2010, 
available at: <http://easttimorlegal.blogspot.com/2010/08/ramos-horta-pardons-attackers.html>.
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 Though the President of the Republic can grant pardons and commute sen-
tences after consultation with the government, the consistent exercise of this 
power in relation to crimes committed in 1999, 2006 and 2008 ‘demonstrate that 
open political intervention in the justice system by the government leadership 
on the grounds of reconciliation and political necessity is clearly considered an 
acceptable action’.153 Though these sorts of pardons and amnesty are anathemised 
the Rule of Law Report, institutional responses like investigatory commissions 
and the significant international role in the investigation, prosecution and trial of 
these crimes appears have little impact on respect for judicial autonomy. Not-
withstanding the dependence of the Timorese justice system on international 
actors, UN missions have singularly failed to engage the government at a politi-
cal or diplomatic level. Criticism is generalised and tepid,154 most notably the 
recommendations of an Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment exercise 
it sponsored for the justice system which merely recommended greater transpar-
ency and victim participation in the pardon process.155 
One Timorese judge has recently opined that ‘Politicians do their job and 
judges do theirs; an institutional culture is needed which recognises the inde-
pendence of the court.’156 It can be surmised that over a decade of intrusive UN 
involvement in judicial institutions has failed to create such a culture. As the UN 
itself concedes,
‘The formal justice system is characterised by a lack of public confidence under-
pinned by perceived impunity … the principle of separation of powers has not 
always been respected. … More recent Presidential pardons and commutations of 
sentences involving a number of cases from 2006 and others have further contributed 
to perceptions of impunity.’157 
153. CIGI, supra n. 137, p. 17.
154. See for example UN Secretary-General Report 2010, supra n. 1, which notes the problem 
at paras. 10-12, 80-87 and 101-105, but offers no solutions in its 2010-2012 plans dealing with the 
justice issues (paras. 88-95) or the culture of democratic governance (paras. 106-112).
155. Rapoza, et al., supra n. 109, p. 85. Perhaps the most damning indictment of the UN’s 
blind faith in institutions abstracted from the politics of the day was its most curious response to 
the 2006 Crisis, namely the formation of a Serious Crimes Investigation Team (SCIT) to resume 
the investigative functions of the SCU for crimes committed in 1999 (SC Res. 1704 (2006), UN 
Doc. S/RES/1704, 15 August 2006, para. 4(a)). The Team was created notwithstanding the facts 
that all those convicted earlier by the Special Panels have been pardoned and that the 2006 vio-
lence bore no relation to what happened in 1999. As of January 2011, 184 investigations out of 
396 outstanding cases had been concluded, without any convictions being secured (UN Secretary-
General Report 2011, supra n. 110, para. 35).
156. CIGI, supra n. 137, p. 9.
157. UN Secretary General 2010 Report, supra n. 1, para. 24.
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6. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF CO-OPERATION
The Timorese experience in one sense affirms the UN’s understanding of the 
triangular relationship between the process of rule of law reconstruction, the 
exigencies of transitional justice in post-conflict states and the security-driven 
imperatives of the nascent democratic polity that emerges from peace-building. 
The reluctance of an incoming government to jeopardise stability by pursuing 
prosecutions was one specifically envisioned by the UN as it wrestled with the 
complexities of intrusive peace-building missions in failing states. The principle 
expressed in the Rule of Law Report that impunity weakens the emerging peace 
may not be universally applicable, but was in this instance borne out by the East 
Timorese experience. As the state advanced from the Special Panel trials to the 
2006 Crisis to the 2008 assassinations, successive waves of impunity appear to 
embolden the commission of serious politically-motivated crimes. 
However, what the last decade also shows is that peace-building’s reliance on 
demonstrably neutral and apolitical institutional responses like teams of inquiry, 
hybridised courts and transfusions of international assistance alone are insuf-
ficient to guarantee the autonomy of reconstructing court systems in politically 
contentious trials without a corresponding willingness to assert it forcefully on 
the political and diplomatic level. As Hameiri argues, ‘The significance of insti-
tutions resides not in their capacity per se, but in the sort of interests they promote 
or marginalize, and in the sort of conflicts they give expression to, or structure 
out of politics.’158 In the Timorese context, successive UN missions have opted 
out of such conflicts. They have been consistently unwilling or unable to use the 
weight of East Timor’s dependence on them to enforce a culture of respect for 
the autonomy of the judicial institutions it built and staffed among East Timor’s 
political leadership. While the bench has proven committed and able to uphold 
the principle of accountability, it is consistently undermined by pardon. Impunity 
in the guise of reconciliation remains preferred to accountability as a response to 
organised political violence, indulged by a government successfully seeking the 
compromises internationalisation was thought to render impossible over adher-
ence to the law of the state. International assistance may be necessary for the 
independence of the judiciary to take root in weak states emerging from war 
or repression, but it will rarely prove sufficient as the peace-building doctrine 
appears to imply. 
As always, a complex of historical, economic and socio-political factors deter-
mines whether lenience and pardon become state policy, and it would be foolish 
to argue the Wiranto episode made certain what happened later. Nonetheless, in 
the context of a newly – independent East Timor, one can with a degree of cer-
tainty point to the Wiranto Indictment as the episode where political exigencies 
first took priority over the independence of the courts and the pursuit of account-
ability. It may demonstrate the Rule of Law Report’s confidence that a process 
158. Hameiri, supra n. 12, p. 140.
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of transitional justice can have a significant impact on the quality of the emerg-
ing rule of law, but not in the manner it expected. One may hypothesise how a 
stronger defence by UNMISET officials of the SCU at the time of the Wiranto 
Indictment could have sent a strong message to new government that the politi-
cisation so normal under Indonesian rule would not be tolerated. Equally, it is 
tempting to ask in recent years how the co-operation of international judges and 
prosecutors on whom the state remains dependent could have been suspended 
pending guarantees that prosecutorial independence would be respected and par-
dons eschewed. 
It is necessary to remind ourselves why the response has been so consistently 
supine. In transition, the path of least resistance is tempting for the simple fact it 
constitutes an easier course for an unstable, democratising leadership reluctant to 
mortgage future progress for past justice. The short-term imperatives of a secu-
rity-conscious government will often win out at the expense of more principled, 
long-term and frequently politically inconvenient respect for the autonomy of the 
institutions of justice on which peace is built, unless genuinely assertive interna-
tional support for the latter is forthcoming in the political sphere where courts are 
weakest. As Chopra notes, the shallow resolve of international organisations can 
rarely hope to succeed against determined local opposition.159 
Notwithstanding the strengthening of institutions with international expertise, 
the rule of law that peace-building missions are mandated to inculcate cannot 
exist where either rulers or ruled (or both) feel free to ignore them. These are 
cultural commitments, radically different from what went before, when it was 
wielded arbitrarily by the former and resented by the latter. It has been noted in 
post-conflict societies that ‘without a widely shared cultural commitment to the 
idea of the rule of law, courts are just buildings, judges are just bureaucrats, and 
constitutions are just pieces of paper’.160 The practice of the Special Panels and 
successive UN missions, by focussing only on institutional matters and wilfully 
disengaging from the more contentious cultural, behavioural and cultural aspects 
of the rule of law,161 have left the Timorese justice system as a hollow shell with 
little more weight than an easily-circumvented bureaucracy.
159. J. Chopra, ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, 33 Development and Change (2002) 
p. 979 at p. 995.
160. J. Stromseth, M. Wippman and R. Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of 
Law After Military Interventions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2006) p. 76. 
161. As one UN official put it, ‘UNTAET was busy developing institutions. They didn’t work 
on the political culture’ (Jarvinen, supra n. 59, p. 36).
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